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Abstract 
 
Speculation is rife as to the impact of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement upon the 
Conservative Government’s plans to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998. In the face of this 
speculation, the UK’s Conservative Government has provided little detail as to how UK 
human-rights reform will address the requirement for incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the Northern Ireland settlement. We therefore analyse the 
Agreement as both an international treaty and peace agreement and evaluate its 
interrelationship with the Human Rights Act and the Northern Ireland Act. Once the 
hyperbole surrounding the Agreement and its attendant domestic legislation is stripped 
away, the effects of the 1998 settlement are in some regards more extensive than has to 
date been recognised, but in other respects are less far-reaching than some of the Human 
Rights Act’s supporters claim. The picture that emerges from our analysis is of an 
intricately woven constitution dependent on devolution arrangements, peace agreements, 
and international relationships.  
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Introduction 
 
Shortfalls in human rights protection within Northern Ireland exacerbated and sustained 
the conflict in Northern Ireland between the 1960s and 1990s, and although human rights 
and equality are concepts ‘central’1 to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (GFA),2 their 
place within Northern Ireland’s legal order remains politically contentious. This is a 
volatile context for the UK Government’s proposals to replace the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), the statute which gave effect to some of its most important GFA commitments. In 
the Northern Ireland Assembly Sinn Féin has condemned the policy as ‘a direct attack on 
the Good Friday Agreement and the international treaty signed by the British and Irish 
Governments, which gives legal effect to the agreement’.3 The Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP), by contrast, has been supportive of HRA repeal, and has questioned the connection 
between the HRA and the GFA. In the words of one of its MLAs, claims that the HRA 
‘was in some way central either to the Good Friday Agreement or to its passage by way of 
referendum is a high level of revisionist history’.4 
The UK’s international human rights commitments were often prominent and 
controversial during the conflict in Northern Ireland.5 High-profile judgments enforced the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)6 in the teeth of UK security policy.7 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 M. Simpson, ‘The Agreement and Devolved Social Security: A Missed Opportunity for Socio-Economic 
Rights in Northern Ireland?’ (2015) 66 NILQ 105, 106. 
2 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Ireland (with annexes) (1998) 2114 UNTS 473. For overview and contextualisation of the 
GFA’s human rights provisions see B. Dickson, ‘The Protection of Human Rights – Lessons from Northern 
Ireland’ [2000] EHRLR 213, C. Harvey, ‘Bringing Humanity Home: A Transformational Human Rights 
Culture for Northern Ireland?’ in A.-M. McAlinden and C. Dwyer, Criminal Justice in Transition: The 
Northern Ireland Context (Hart, 2015) p.47, M. Lamb, ‘Loyalty and Human Rights: Liminality and Social 
Action in a Divided Society’ (2010) 14 IJHR 994 and B. O’Leary, ‘The Nature of the Agreement’ (1999) 22 
Fordham ILJ 1628. 
3 C. Ruane, MLA, NIA Deb., vol. 105, no. 2, p.41 (1 Jun 2015). 
4 P. Weir, MLA, NIA Deb., vol. 105, no. 2, p.48 (1 Jun 2015). 
5 See J. Winter, ‘Abuses and Activism: The Role of Human Rights in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace 
Process’ (2013) EHRLR 1.  
6 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) 213 UNTS 222. 
7 See Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25, relating to inhuman and degrading treatment of 
republican internees, Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117, relating to police pre-charge detention 
powers in Northern Ireland found to breach the right to liberty and McCann v United Kingdom (1996) 21 
EHRR 97, relating to breach of the right to life as a result of inadequate planning in an SAS operation in 
which three Provisional IRA members were shot dead. For an overarching analysis of the significance of the 
ECHR to the conflict in Northern Ireland, see B. Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Conflict in Northern Ireland (OUP, 2010). 
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Whereas Nationalists of all stripes regarded the ECHR as a counterweight to UK 
Government policy, many Unionists maintained that the Strasbourg system prioritised 
individual rights at the expense of security considerations and that human rights 
organisations addressed state violations of rights but not those perpetrated by paramilitary 
groups.8 These concerns reinforced doctrinaire Unionist scepticism towards rights 
discourse as being impossible to reconcile with parliamentary sovereignty’s place within 
the UK’s constitutional arrangements.9 Against this backdrop the Ulster Unionist Party’s 
(UUP) acceptance in the GFA that human rights protections had a place within the 
Northern Ireland peace process was all the more significant. Unionists might not exactly 
‘picked up the human rights ball and [run] with it’,10 but the UUP at least acknowledged 
that rights-based commitments would play a prominent role in the post-GFA legislative 
settlement. The DUP, then estranged from the peace process, made no such commitment. 
Although it eventually became reconciled to the process in the St Andrews Agreement11 it 
has ever since sought to dilute human rights components of the 1998 settlement. In 
response to its political rival the UUP has resisted any strengthening of those human rights 
protections.12  
The GFA’s human rights provisions were operationalised in domestic law by a 
combination of the HRA and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA), with the latter providing 
‘in effect a constitution’ for Northern Ireland.13 Proposals for overhaul or repeal of the 
HRA, however, put these protections at risk and threaten the GFA’s delicate inter-
institutional balance. The proposals have also generated opposition from the devolved 
legislatures of Scotland and Wales, but the prominence of devolution and human rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 See P. Munce, ‘Unionism and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 1999–2005: Hostility, 
Hubris and Hesitancy’ (2014) 29 Irish Political Studies 194, 205-206. 
9 See A. Morgan, The Belfast Agreement: A Practical Legal Analysis (Belfast Press, 2000) 358-359 and C. 
Turner, ‘Political representations of law in Northern Ireland’ [2010] PL 451, 454-456. 
10 P. Mageean and M. O’Brien, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday 
Agreement’ (1998) 22 Fordham ILJ 1499, 1538. 
11 Agreement at St Andrews (13 Oct 2006). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-
st-andrews-agreement-october-2006. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
12 See UUP, ‘Ulster Unionist Party Position on a Bill of Rights’ (2011). Available at: 
http://uup.org/assets/images/featured/Ulster%20Unionist%20Party%20Position%20on%20a%20Bill%20of
%20Rights.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
13 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32; [2002] NI 390, [11] (Lord Bingham). 
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within the GFA raise Northern-Ireland-specific issues.14 The confluence of the UK’s GFA 
obligations, disagreements between the Northern Ireland parties over the role of human 
rights within Northern Ireland’s governance and the complexity of relations between 
Westminster and the Assembly produces an ‘obscure yet systemic constitutional 
conundrum’.15 In this article we unpack the GFA’s complex status as an international legal 
agreement, a peace settlement and a de facto constitutional instrument, to enable us to 
explain the impact of the “Northern Ireland conundrum” on UK-wide human rights reform. 
We first explain how the UK’s obligations under the GFA have shaped human rights 
protections in Northern Ireland. Second, we outline the pressure upon the HRA and how 
its detractors have neglected its relationship with the GFA. Third, we assess whether 
substantive reform of the HRA’s operation in Northern Ireland’s law can be reconciled 
with the terms of the 1998 settlement, and whether the UK Government needs, as a matter 
of constitutional convention, to obtain the Northern Ireland Assembly’s consent to reform 
or repeal the HRA. Fourth, if the UK Government acts in contravention of these 
obligations, we consider the remedies which exist under international law. We conclude 
that a proactive redrawing of the 1998 settlement’s human rights and devolution elements 
with the involvement of the Northern Ireland parties offers the only GFA-compliant route 
forward. If the UK Government seeks to pay lip service to these commitments, Ireland’s 
role as the GFA’s co-guarantor under international law assumes particular significance. 
 
Pressure for the HRA’s Repeal  
 
The HRA formed part of a wider package of constitutional reform that was brought forward 
during the first term of Tony Blair’s Labour Government. Labour’s consultation process 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 This is demonstrated by the public concerns of the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales for the impact of 
the proposals on the GFA’s arrangements; Scottish Government, ‘News - First Ministers of Scotland and 
Wales Meet’ (3 Jun 2015). Available at: http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/First-Ministers-of-Scotland-and-
Wales-meet-1988.aspx. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
15 P. England and A. Barnett, ‘Why does the UK need a Constitutional Convention? An interview with 
Anthony King’ Our Kingdom (29 Jul 2015). Available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/anthony-barnett/why-does-uk-need-constitutional-
convention-interview-with-anthony-barnett. Accessed 25 Jan 2017.  
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on the Human Rights Bill was framed as “bringing rights home”,16 and, as such, the 
subsequent legislation addressed Labour’s desire to align the UK’s domestic rights 
protections with its international legal obligations under the ECHR.17 Prior to the HRA the 
dualist nature of the UK’s constitutional order meant that, as an unincorporated treaty, the 
ECHR (and with it the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) jurisprudence) played 
a minimal role in domestic civil liberties cases.18 As a result of the inability of domestic 
courts to resolve some rights claims, the pre-HRA system contributed to a series of 
embarrassing adverse ECtHR judgments. As the ECHR’s renown grew, an increasing 
number of applications from the UK were lodged with the Strasbourg institutions.19 This 
traffic emphasised the inefficiency of the UK’s pre-HRA arrangements as a system of 
rights protections.  
The HRA increased the human-rights role of the UK’s domestic courts. Section 6 
imposes a duty upon public authorities to act in a manner compatible with a range of 
incorporated ECHR rights (unless they are otherwise bound by primary legislation) which 
can be enforced by the domestic courts. When a literal interpretation of primary legislation 
permits an abuse of human rights, section 3 obliges judges to reading the legislation in a 
human-rights-compliant manner if it is possible to do so. This provision gives Parliament’s 
blessing to judicial reinterpretation of statute, in theory shielding judges from accusations 
of unwarranted judicial activism.20 And if such a reinterpretation is not possible, as it would 
go against the grain of the legislation,21 section 4 allows senior judges to issue a declaration 
of incompatibility, warning Parliament that the legislative provision in question is at 
serious risk of an adverse ruling by Strasbourg. Only 20 such declarations have been made 
since the HRA’s introduction,22 and they can be ignored by the Government and UK 
Parliament. For example, successive Governments have ignored a Declaration of 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 J. Straw and P. Boateng, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Labour’s Plans to Incorporate the European Convention 
on Human Rights into UK Law’ [1997] EHRLR 71. 
17 J. Straw, MP, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (HMSO, 1997) para.1.11. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf. Accessed 
25 Jan 2017. 
18 See Lord Donaldson, HL Deb, vol. 560, col. 1154 (25 Jan 1995). 
19 See Straw (above n.17), para.1.14. 
20 See Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions [2004] UKHL 43; [2005] 1 AC 264, [24] (Lord Bingham). 
21 See Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 AC 557, [33] (Lord Nicholls).  
22 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Seventh Report: Human Rights Judgments (2015) HL Paper 130/HC 
1088, para.4.1. 
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Incompatibility concerning the disenfranchisement of prisoners issued in 2007.23 
Notwithstanding such contentious issues these powers have enabled many clear-cut cases 
of rights abuses to be dealt with within the UK’s domestic legal orders. The years since the 
HRA entered force have consequently seen a decline in the number of adverse Strasbourg 
judgments against the UK, despite a higher number of claims being instituted.24  
Many Conservative politicians and large sections of the press have nonetheless 
consistently condemned ‘Labour’s Human Rights Act’.25 The Conservatives have 
presented the Act as ‘a charter for miscreants to pursue their individualistic interests 
through the courts’,26 even though its use by unpopular or disadvantaged groups within 
society is in keeping with it being a counter-majoritarian constitutional device. They have 
furthermore insisted that section 2’s requirement that the domestic courts take into account 
Strasbourg’s case law in their decisions ‘means problematic Strasbourg jurisprudence is 
often being applied in UK law’27 and challenged domestic courts’ ability to reinterpret 
legislation in a rights-compliant manner as a threat to parliamentary sovereignty.28 
Following the 2010 general election disagreement within the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government over the HRA’s future led to the establishment of a 
Commission on a Bill of Rights in 2011.29 The Commissioners agreed that large sections 
of the public had an ‘ownership issue’ when it came to human rights,30 sustained by 
misgivings over the role and influence of the ECtHR within the UK’s legal systems.31 Some 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 Ibid., para 4.13. 
24 See A. Donald, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights against the 
UK: Unravelling the Paradox’ in L. Hodson, L. Wicks and K. Ziegler (eds), The UK and European Human 
Rights – A Strained Relationship? (Hart, 2015) p.135. 
25 D. Cameron, MP, HC Deb, vol. 598, col. 311 (8 Jul 2015). 
26 A. Donald and E. Mottershaw, Identifying Human Rights Stories: A Scoping Study (2014) p.3. Available 
at: http://www.mdx.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/135318/Identifying-human-rights-stories-July-
2014.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
27 Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (2014) p.6. Available at: 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf. Accessed 
25 Jan 2017. 
28 Ibid., p.4. 
29 The Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (Dec 2012). Available 
at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130128112038/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr
/uk-bill-rights-vol-1.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
30 Ibid., vol. 1, pp.28-29. 
31 Ibid., vol. 1, p.183 (Lord Faulks QC and Jonathan Fisher QC).  
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of the Commissioners, however, maintained that the HRA had been subjected to a 
campaign of misinformation32 which had also exaggerated how often the ECtHR finds that 
the UK has breached its ECHR commitments.33 
 
The GFA, Human Rights and International Law 
 
The GFA involved both a settlement between the parties in Northern Ireland and a bilateral 
international treaty between Ireland and the UK. In contemporary peace settlements this 
duality is not unusual, with state-only treaties and settlements having given way to inter-
linked settlements between state and non-state actors.34 This shift therefore reflects broader 
changes within international law, but the legal status of such a peace agreement remains 
both under-defined and under-explored.35  
 
The GFA as a Bilateral International Treaty 
 
The Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (with annexes) comes firmly within the 
purview of public international law. That both Governments sought to have their bilateral 
agreement indexed with the UN Treaty Series demonstrates the intended ‘international’ 
character of the Treaty and its binding nature under international law. This section of our 
analysis examines the operation of this Bilateral Treaty under customary international law 
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).36 Within this framework the 
legal position of Northern Ireland’s political parties is complex. Christine Bell notes that 
the 1998 Agreement is in fact composed of two agreements; one between all of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 Ibid., vol. 1, p.232 (Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC). 
33 See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Seventh Report: Human Rights Judgments (2015) HL Paper 
130/HC 1088, para.2.1-2.2. 
34 A database of contemporary peace agreements is available at, 
http://www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/peace_agreements_database.html. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
35 C. Bell, ‘Peace agreements: Their nature and legal status’ (2006) 100 AJIL 373, 374. 
36 Both parties are signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, (1980) 1155 UNTS 
331. Although Ireland did not accede until 2006, by the mid-1990s the Vienna Convention had come to be 
regarded as reflective of customary international law; see I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (2nd Ed, Manchester University Press, 1984) pp.5-10 and A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 
(3rd Ed, CUP, 2013) pp.10-11. 
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negotiating and consenting parties at the preceding talks (the multi-party agreement), and 
another between the UK and Ireland (the inter-state agreement).37 Even though the GFA 
expressly recognises the interests of the negotiating parties38 and Northern Ireland’s 
inhabitants in the fulfilment of its terms, under international law the UK’s obligations are 
owed to Ireland.39  
The annexed provisions referred to in the GFA’s full title include the Agreement 
Reached in the Multiparty Negotiations. Annexes are considered to be essential elements 
of a treaty and are thus not less binding than the main text unless an agreement indicates 
otherwise, which is not the case with the GFA.40 Within the Treaty’s annexed provisions 
is a section on ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity’, which opens with the 
parties affirming a partial catalogue of ‘the civil rights and the liberties of everyone in the 
community’. Although this account of fundamental rights ‘is purely aspirational as 
between the political parties’,41 it sets the tone for the subsequent provisions which deal 
with the two governments’ legislative commitments:  
 
The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, 
and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule 
Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.42 … 
The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of 
human rights in its jurisdiction.43 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
37 C. Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (OUP, 2008) p.146. 
38 Eight Northern Ireland political parties signed up to the GFA (in order of their then vote-share, the Ulster 
Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party, the Progressive 
Unionist Party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, the Ulster Democratic Party and Labour). The 
Democratic Unionist Party was the only major Northern Ireland Party to oppose the GFA. 
39 For full details of the complexities of peace agreement construction, see Bell (above n.37), p.144. 
40 GFA, Article 4. 
41 Morgan, The Belfast Agreement (above n.9), p.376. 
42 GFA, Section 6, para.2. 
43 Ibid., Section 6, para.9. 
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The conformity of Ireland and the UK’s legislative arrangements with the requirements of 
the GFA can therefore be evaluated, within international law, by reference to the terms of 
the Bilateral Treaty and its Annexes.  
The VCLT provides a method of scrutinising the latitude available under the 
Bilateral Treaty.44 Under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, parties are bound to act in 
good faith throughout negotiation and implementation of a treaty,45 which provides the 
basis for assessing parties’ conformity with their treaty obligations.46 Once a treaty is in 
force the state parties, in this case Ireland and the UK, must act in good faith with regard 
to all elements of the Bilateral Treaty. In this context “good faith” depends upon the 
ordinary meaning of a treaty’s terms, considered in light of its object and purpose.47 To 
ascertain the object and purpose, parties can use both the wording of a treaty and also the 
preamble and annexes.48 Other relevant materials include instruments made by one or more 
of the parties in the course of concluding a treaty (and which are accepted by other parties 
as related to it). A bad-faith breach of international obligations includes the non-
performance of specific treaty terms. This would cover a failure by the UK to introduce 
legislation incorporating the ECHR into Northern Ireland law or the subsequent abrogation 
of those rights. States cannot invoke changes in the political complexion of the executive 
or legislative branches of Government, or reforms required by domestic law, to negate their 
obligation to act in good faith.49  
 
The GFA as a Peace Agreement 
 
State parties to international peace agreements do not merely owe obligations to each other, 
but also to individuals within their jurisdiction.50 Accordingly, action by the UK 
                                                                                                                                                             
44 See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd Ed, CUP, 2013) and E. Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of 
Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP, 2011). 
45 J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law International, 1996) p.39. See also 
O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1991). 
46 VCLT, Article 26. 
47 Ibid., Article 31. 
48 See V. Crnic-Grotic, ‘Object and Purpose of Treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ 
(1997) 7 Asian Yearbook of International Law 141. 
49 VCLT, Article 27. 
50 On these obligations in the context of peace agreements and human rights see respectively Crnic-Grotic 
(above n.48), 145 and H. Steiner, ‘International Protection of Human Rights’ in M. Evans (ed), International 
Law (3rd edn, OUP, 2010) 784, pp.800-801. 
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Government which violates the terms of the GFA is not only a breach of the UK’s 
obligations to Ireland, but also a violation of its commitments to the people of Northern 
Ireland. These commitments to individuals tend to be enforced in more diffuse ways than 
would be the case with the commitments to other countries, but in the context of the GFA 
there are a number of local, national and international monitoring bodies and organisations 
that could flag up potential breaches. With regard to the proposed repeal of the HRA the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) and the Irish Human Rights and 
Equality Commission (IHREC) have expressed their concerns in a joint statement to the 
Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Implementation of the GFA.51 Civil society 
organisations have also issued statements,52 putting on notice international bodies such as 
the Council of Europe and the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee.53 As reform 
proposals develop the Joint Committee of the NIHRC and the IHREC, a cross-border 
initiative established by the GFA,54 could play a pivotal role.55 
The GFA does not require ECHR-equivalent protections defined by and adjudicated 
within the UK. Instead, reflecting the widespread mistrust of loose talk of “British values” 
in Northern Ireland,56 it explicitly mandates that the ECHR arrangements apply generally 
within Northern Ireland’s legal system. Moreover, in a second lock, the GFA envisaged 
that the Northern Ireland Assembly would be bound to legislate in compliance with the 
ECHR.57 The HRA and the NIA together implement these requirements. Under the NIA, 
the Northern Ireland Assembly can legislate to enhance rights protections available within 
                                                                                                                                                             
51 Joint Statement of IHREC and NIHRC (25 June 2015). Available at: 
http://www.nihrc.org/news/detail/joint-statement-of-irish-human-rights-and-equality-commission-and-
northern. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. See also, the earlier reaction by, NIHRC, ‘Chief Commissioner Responds 
to Human Rights Proposals’ (12 May 2015). Available at: http://www.nihrc.org/news/detail/chief-
commissioner-responds-to-human-rights-proposals. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
52 Committee on the Administration of Justice, ‘Tory Plan to Repeal Human Rights Act in NI Would 
Constitute Flagrant Breach of GFA’ (11 May 2015). Available at: http://www.caj.org.uk/contents/1293. 
Accessed 25 Jan 2017; Amnesty International (Ireland), ‘Human Rights Act: Amnesty Warns Repeal Moves 
Could Undermine Peace In Northern Ireland’ (14 May 2015). Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.ie/node/4293. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
53 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, ‘UK Commissions Alert United Nations Committee on 
Human Rights Act’ (18 Jun 2015). Available at: http://www.nihrc.org/news/detail/uk-commissions-alert-
united-nations-on-human-rights-act. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
54 GFA, Section 6, para.10. 
55 See Bell (above n.37), p.175. 
56 See C. Harvey, ‘Taking the Next Step? Achieving another Bill of Rights’ [2011] EHRLR 24, 28-29. 
57 GFA, Strand 1, para.26. 
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Northern Ireland’s law, but is obliged to respect the ECHR standards.58 If Assembly 
legislation conflicts with the incorporated ECHR rights, ‘the courts are supreme and are 
required to strike down all and any “unconstitutional” acts of the devolved legislature’.59 
This process can be contrasted with the treatment of Westminster’s enactments, which 
continue to shape many areas of law in Northern Ireland. In this context the HRA 
incorporates the same range of ECHR rights, but its rights-protection mechanisms, 
including declarations of incompatibility and the reinterpretation clause, have produced ‘a 
dance of deference between the judiciary and legislature but one where ultimately 
Parliament has the last word’.60  
The resultant human rights protections are not always entirely coherent. The 
Northern Ireland Assembly has the power to alter existing Westminster statutes within its 
areas of competence, at which point the Assembly legislation can be struck down by the 
courts if it is not ECHR compatible. Until the Assembly legislates on one of these devolved 
matters, however, the courts only possess the limited HRA powers with regard to 
Westminster statutes. When the courts identify an inadequate protection in an existing 
statute it is for the Northern Ireland Assembly to take legislative steps to rectify such 
provisions. In NIHRC’s Application,61 for example, the Northern Ireland High Court 
declared that the criminal offences relating to abortion operative in Northern Ireland Law, 
as set out under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,62 is incompatible with Articles 
8 ECHR.63 The High Court could not strike down these provisions, as they are contained 
within an Act of Parliament, but the Assembly (and not Westminster) has the primary 
responsibility for whether and how to amend the legislation.  
This messiness showcases the half-finished nature of Northern Ireland’s peace 
process.64 The Bilateral Treaty and its Annex envisaged an “ECHR-plus” arrangement for 
                                                                                                                                                             
58 NIA, s.6(2)(c). 
59 A. O’Neill, ‘Stands Scotland Where it Did?’ (2006) 57 NILQ 102, 106. 
60 Ibid., 106. 
61 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2015] NIQB 96 and [2015] NIQB 102. 
62 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s.58 and 59. See also the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland), 
s.25. 
63 NIHRC’s Application [2015] NIQB 102, [5] (Horner J). 
64 See C. McCrudden, ‘Consociationalism, Equality, Minorities in the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights Debate: 
The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’ in J. Morison, K. McEvoy and G. 
Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition and Human Rights (OUP, 2007) p.315. 
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Northern Ireland, whereby the transitional HRA/NIA arrangements would ultimately be 
superseded by the NIHRC’s drafting of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.65 When the 
Commission’s proposals were debated in 2011, however, the Assembly divided 46-42 
against their adoption, with the Unionist parties combining to block any extension to rights 
protections in Northern Ireland’s law.66 Having received no responses from the Northern 
Ireland parties to subsequent queries on the proposals, in 2012 the Northern Ireland Office 
minister Hugo Swire informed his predecessor Paul Murphy that the transitional 
arrangements put in place after the GFA had ossified: 
 
The House will want to acknowledge the right hon. Gentleman’s part in the Good 
Friday agreement in trying to pursue the Bill of Rights. Frankly, however, that was 
when he should have pursued it, instead of squandering the good will that he and his 
Government had generated at that time.67 
 
The Stormont House Agreement identifies the stalemate on this issue, noting that ‘there is 
not at present consensus on a Bill of Rights’.68 
In the face of this mixture of apathy and antipathy towards building upon the 
existing human rights arrangements amongst the Northern Ireland parties the UK and Irish 
Governments have reasserted the GFA’s obligations in subsequent negotiations. The 2006 
St Andrews Agreement reaffirmed the importance of the GFA’s human rights provisions69 
and in an annex which outlines the UK Government’s obligations relating to ‘Human 
Rights, Equality, Victims and Other Issues’, new powers were outlined for the NIHRC.70 
The unagreed final draft produced by the 2013 Haass talks placed significant emphasis on 
                                                                                                                                                             
65 GFA, Section 6, para.4 and NIA, s.69(7). For an overview of the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights debate, 
see C. Harvey, ‘Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ (2009) 60 NILQ 181 and A. Kavanagh, ‘The 
Role of a Bill of Rights in Reconstructing Northern Ireland’ (2004) 26 HRQ 964. 
66 See H. Swire, MP, HC Deb., vol. 541, col. 832 (7 Mar 2012). 
67 Ibid., col.831. 
68 Stormont House Agreement (23 Dec 2014) para.69. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390672/Stormont_House_A
greement.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
69 St Andrews Agreement (above n.11), sections 3 and 8 and Annex E. 
70 Ibid., Annex B.  
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the ECHR with regard to parades.71 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement also indicates 
the ECHR’s continued centrality in the peace process. With regard to parades72 and the 
Historical Investigations Unit,73 compliance with the ECHR is explicitly required. 
Elsewhere, the 2014 Agreement affirmed the need for mechanisms for dealing with the 
past to be ‘human rights compliant’,74 and noted the negotiating parties’ obligation to 
promote human rights in lieu of an agreed Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.75 These 
subsequent agreements prevent the DUP from presenting itself as consistently opposed to 
the operation of the ECHR within Northern Ireland’s law. 
The ECHR and its institutions therefore remain a consistent base line within the 
ongoing peace process, providing an international system for rights protection which the 
parties involved in the peace process can accept.76 The “foreignness” of the ECHR to the 
UK’s legal traditions, which the Conservative leadership finds so suspect, underpinned its 
place within the GFA. The ECHR could not, in 1998 or since, be claimed as particular to 
the narrative of one community within Northern Ireland.77 Repealing the HRA risks 
unpicking this settlement,78 and the UK Bill of Rights Commission unsurprisingly 
recognised considerable reticence within Northern Ireland about the need for HRA 
reform.79 Two Commissioners went so far as to conclude that in Northern Ireland ‘the 
existing arrangements … are not merely tolerated but strongly supported’.80 When many 
of the complaints regarding the HRA voiced in other parts of the UK concern the rights of 
                                                                                                                                                             
71 R. Haass, ‘Proposed Agreement 31 Dec 2013: An Agreement Among The Parties Of The Northern Ireland 
Executive On Parades, Select Commemorations, And Related Protests; Flags And Emblems; And 
Contending With The Past’ (31 Dec 2013) p.4. 
72 Stormont House Agreement (above n.68), para.19.  
73 Ibid, para.31. 
74 Ibid, para.21. 
75 Ibid, para.69. 
76 See M. Lamb, ‘Ethno-nationalist Conflict, Participation and Human Rights-based Solidarity in Northern 
Ireland’ (2013) 17 IJHR 723, 729. 
77 See G. Hogan, ‘Incorporation of the ECHR: Some Issues of Methodology and Process’ in U. Kilkelly (ed), 
ECHR and Irish Law (Jordans, 2004) 13, p.16. The ECHR’s cultural neutrality has not prevented the GFA’s 
human rights provisions and institutions being perceived as a threat by unionists, see Turner (above n.9), 
457-459. 
78 See Equality and Human Rights Commission, The Case for the Human Rights Act: Part 1 of 3 Responses 
to the Commission on a Bill of Rights: HRA Plus not Minus (2011) p.86. Available at: 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/legal-and-policy/legislation/bill-rights/case-human-rights-act. 
Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
79 See Commission on a Bill of Rights (above n.29), vol. 1, p.165. 
80 Ibid., vol.1, p.32 (Helena Kennedy QC and Philippe Sands QC). 
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prisoners and terrorist suspects it can come as little surprise that such issues play very 
differently in the Northern Ireland context.  
 
The GFA’s relationship with the HRA 
 
The relationship between the GFA and the HRA is indirect. The GFA required that the UK 
incorporate the ECHR into Northern Ireland law, with the substance of this obligation 
being more important than the legislative instrument used to achieve it. At the time of the 
GFA, the parties seem to have considered the HRA’s UK-wide rights protections as an 
interim measure within the peace settlement, to operate while a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights was being drafted. These factors do not, however, negate the GFA’s applicability 
to efforts to repeal or reform the HRA. Although the HRA is not explicitly mentioned 
within the GFA, the broader context of a treaty’s operation may be considered in assessing 
the obligations it generates, including pre-existing and subsequent practice relevant to the 
treaty’s application. In April 1998 the negotiating parties were on notice of the substantial 
progress already made towards the HRA’s enactment. The White Paper which preceded 
the Bill explained some key aspects of its effect upon on any devolved institutions which 
might be subsequently be agreed by the Northern Ireland parties.81 Moreover, although the 
HRA does not in fact incorporate the ECHR in its entirety,82 the Irish Government was 
satisfied that it fulfilled the GFA’s requirements; ‘[i]n the area of Human Rights, the British 
Government undertook to complete incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This was achieved through the Human Rights Act, 1998’.83 Joint Irish-UK 
Government statements which acknowledge the HRA’s significance for the GFA are also 
important. The Joint Declaration issued in April 2003, for example, commended the HRA’s 
operation and discussed the further extension of human rights protections.84 
The ECHR-incorporation provision must also be assessed in light of other elements 
of the Bilateral Treaty, including and the UK Government’s broader commitments to 
                                                                                                                                                             
81 Straw, Rights Brought Home (above n.17) para.2.23. 
82 See HRA, Sch.1 and NIA, s.71(5). The right to an effective remedy (ECHR, Article 13) is not incorporated 
into UK law and the UK has not signed up to some of the rights contained within the ECHR’s additional 
protocols (such as Article 2, Protocol 4, on freedom of movement). 
83 B. Cowen, TD, Dáil Éireann Debates, vol. 539, WA 19135/01 (27 Jun 2001). 
84 ‘Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments’ (April 2003), Annex 3 para 2.  
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ensure fair functioning of the criminal justice system85 and the requirement upon the Irish 
Government to examine ‘the question of incorporation of the ECHR’ and to ‘ensure at least 
an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland’.86 
Under international law the doctrine of reciprocity envisages that a state’s obligations 
under a treaty are balanced against consequent advantages, an outcome that is mirrored by 
the obligations upon, and advantages secured by, other state parties. Reciprocity does not 
necessarily require that state parties mirror each other’s actions in responding to treaty 
obligations, but rather depends upon whether divergent approaches are proportionate in 
light of a treaty’s aims.87 The Bilateral Treaty envisages different arrangements for 
implementation of the ECHR into law in Northern Ireland and in Ireland. The GFA does 
not, for example, explicitly call for the ECHR’s incorporation into Irish law, meaning that 
the existence of some distinctions in the approaches to rights protection within these 
jurisdictions do not suggest a breakdown in reciprocity. In light of the obligation upon the 
UK to make the ECHR rights justiciable within Northern Ireland’s legal system it 
nonetheless proved difficult for the Irish Government to develop an alternate means by 
which Ireland could satisfy the equivalent-protection requirement.88 Indeed, once the GFA 
entered into effect, the Irish Government explicitly based its plans for the incorporation of 
the ECHR on the HRA model.89 This included the replication of much of the HRA’s 
architecture in the European Convention on Human Rights Act (ECHR Act) 2003.90 The 
Joint Committee’s advice – mandated by the GFA91 – relating to a Charter of Rights for 
the Island of Ireland is also notable for its efforts to map, and demonstrate the 
                                                                                                                                                             
85 GFA, Section 6, para.8. 
86 Ibid., Section 6, para.9. 
87 D. Greig, ‘Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties’ (1994) 34 Virginia JIL 295, 298. 
88 Morgan, The Belfast Agreement (above n.9), pp.395-396. 
89 J. O’Donoghue, TD, Dáil Éireann Debates, vol. 523, WA 20184/00 (5 Oct 2000). See F. de Londras, 
‘Neither herald nor fanfare: The limited impact of the ECHR Act 2003 on rights infrastructure in Ireland’, in 
S. Egan, L. Thornton and J. Walsh (eds), Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights: 60 Years 
and Beyond (Bloomsbury Professional, 2014) 37, pp.52-54. 
90 Basing the ECHR Act 2003 on the HRA arguably demonstrated Ireland’s substantive commitment to the 
GFA, but its record as a self-standing human rights instrument is more dubious. See F. de Londras, 
‘Declarations of Incompatibility Under the ECHR Act 2003: A Workable Transplant?’ (2014) 35 Statute 
Law Rev 50 and F. de Londras and C. Kelly, European Convention on Human Rights Act: Operation, Impact 
and Analysis (Round Hall/Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
91 GFA, Section 6, para.10. 
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complementarities of, human rights protections available across the two jurisdictions.92 
Reciprocity is therefore central to Ireland’s objections to any weakening of human rights 
protections through HRA reform.93 
 
Options for GFA-compliant HRA Reform 
 
The 2015 Conservative Party Manifesto pledged to ‘scrap the Human Rights Act, and 
introduce a British Bill of Rights’.94 In response to questions on the implications of the 
GFA for the Conservative Government’s plans, the then Justice Minister Dominic Raab 
limply asserted that ‘[w]e will consider the implications of a Bill of Rights on devolution 
as we develop our proposals’.95 His counterpart in the House of Lords maintained that the 
Government ‘will fully engage with the devolved Administrations and the Republic of 
Ireland in view of the relevant provisions of the … Good Friday … Agreement’.96 These 
holding statements indicate that even if HRA reform could satisfy the GFA’s human-rights 
provisions, its devolution arrangements provide further challenges for the Conservative 
Government’s agenda. The GFA provided the platform by which power could be devolved 
to Northern Ireland institutions alongside similar transfers to Wales and Scotland. 
Westminster “loaned” law-making powers within certain areas of competence to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, but maintained its power to legislate in respect of devolved 
matters.97 The UK Parliament’s sovereignty has, nonetheless, been tempered as a matter of 
practice when it seeks to legislate in devolved areas by the operation of constitutional 
conventions. HRA reform is therefore a complex proposition for a Conservative 
Government with a slender Commons majority. The repeated delays in the publication of 
a draft Bill of Rights point to ministers wrestling with the difficulties posed by unpicking 
                                                                                                                                                             
92 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and Irish Human Rights Commission, ‘The Advice of the 
Joint Committee on a Charter of Rights for the Island of Ireland’ (2011) Available at: 
http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/charter-of-rights-advice-june-2011-final.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 
2017.  
93 See C. Flanagan, TD, ‘Commencement Matters: International Agreements’ (Seanad, 14 May 2015). 
94 Conservative Party, ‘The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015’ p.60. Available at 
https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto. Accessed 25 Jan 2017. 
95 D. Raab, MP, HC Deb., WA 5209 (6 Jul 2015).  
96 Lord Faulks, HL Deb., vol. 762, col. 2209 (2 Jul 2015). 
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one element from the 1998 constitutional reforms. In this section we examine the problems 
facing different versions of HRA reform in turn. 
 
Cosmetic Change to the HRA 
 
The Conservative Government could give effect to its headline proposal to scrap the HRA 
by simply rebadging the legislation and maintaining comparable levels of rights protection 
within UK law. Under this approach the HRA would be replaced with a “British Bill of 
Rights” which retains the ECHR rights incorporated into the UK’s legal orders, the duty of 
domestic courts to have regard to Strasbourg jurisprudence and the right of individual 
petition to Strasbourg. Even though such a measure would ‘not appear to depart 
significantly from the Human Rights Act’,98 some question whether it would satisfy the 
GFA’s human-rights obligations. The GFA has been said to the continuation of the HRA 
in its present form,99 on the basis that the parties were aware that the UK Parliament was 
working on this legislation at the time of the negotiations.100 Indeed, the Irish Government 
has maintained that the UK’s obligations were ‘given [effect] in the 1998 UK Human 
Rights Act’.101 The HRA explicitly extends to Northern Ireland, whereas Wales and 
Scotland are not mentioned in the text (being covered by implication).102 The GFA’s terms, 
however, merely mandate that the UK Government must ‘complete incorporation into 
Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights’.103 It does not specify 
the HRA as the vehicle by which this incorporation is achieved. Moreover, given the 
NIHRC’s remit under the GFA to draft a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland,104 the 
negotiating parties must have intended that the HRA, if enacted, would be a placeholder 
measure, which would assume at most a background role when a Northern Ireland-specific 
Bill of Rights came into effect. 
                                                                                                                                                             
98 European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a British Bill of Rights (2016) HL 139, para.46. 
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Compliance with the GFA thus depends upon the degree to which the ECHR is 
embedded within Northern Ireland’s law, not the legislative tool used to fulfil this task. 
Nonetheless, labelling any replacement for the HRA a “British” Bill of Rights would be 
loaded with unwelcome symbolism in the Northern-Ireland context. Throughout the GFA, 
‘British’ and ‘Irish’ are used to distinguish the different traditions within Northern 
Ireland.105 Independent of the substance of such legislation, a “British” Bill of Rights would 
inevitably be perceived as partisan in its operation. Describing the new legislation as a 
“United Kingdom Bill of Rights” avoids this specific incongruence with the GFA’s 
language, but any national appellation is likely to generate tension. Although an entirely 
cosmetic change to the title of the legislation would thus not fall foul of the GFA, even 
such a minimal reform could produce a destabilising effect within Northern Ireland.  
The conformity of any more substantive HRA reforms with the GFA depends upon 
the impact of specific reforms on the degree of ECHR incorporation within Northern 
Ireland’s law. The Conservatives’ most prominent proposal has been to ‘curtail the role of 
the European Court of Human Rights’106 within the UK’s domestic legal systems by 
revisiting the HRA’s requirement that domestic courts should take into account 
interpretations of human rights adopted by Strasbourg.107 This could involve reworking 
this HRA provision to make it explicit that the Strasbourg’s human rights jurisprudence is 
purely ‘advisory’ in character.108 As scope already exists under the HRA for the UK’s 
courts to adopt interpretations of rights which diverge from the position taken by 
Strasbourg, such a reform could therefore be seen to be cosmetic in character, and might 
not undermine the UK’s GFA commitments.109 The Conservatives have, however, also 
suggested weakening the courts’ power under the HRA to reinterpret legislation so far as 
possible to conform with human rights,110 on the basis that this power allows judges to 
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adopt unnatural readings of a statute which were not intended by Parliament.111 They also 
propose introducing a seriousness threshold for instituting human-rights claims, which 
‘could undermine the commitment of the UK to facilitate direct access to the courts and to 
remedies for breaches of the Convention’.112 In light of the fact that the powers Northern 
Ireland’s courts possess to address statutory human rights breaches under the HRA are 
already weak, any further diminution would, in many cases, render human-rights 
protections nugatory.  
Reforms which adjust, but maintain, the relationship between Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and Northern Ireland’s law, can be subjected to a three-step touchstone test 
for GFA compatibility. HRA-reform proposals must maintain the level of ECHR 
‘incorporation’, ‘direct access to the courts’ and the ‘power for the courts to overrule 
Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency’ with the ECHR.113 These criteria, 
subject to broader devolution and political considerations, might therefore permit some 
weakening of the link to Strasbourg jurisprudence. Legislative limitations curtailing 
particular ECHR rights or restricting their application to certain groups would be contrary 
to the Agreement. This would include, for instance, the exclusion of prisoners or the armed 
forces from the ambit of domestic human rights protections or the restriction of the 
domestic operation of Article 8 ECHR. Even cosmetic changes to the current HRA scheme 
would thus be subject to GFA restrictions. Beyond such limited changes, proposals which 
explicitly prevent the UK courts from relying upon Strasbourg’s jurisprudence would have 
a substantial impact on human rights in Northern Ireland, and therefore warrant separate 
consideration. 
 
Breaking the Link with the ECHR Institutions 
 
A mere rebadging exercise, tweaking particular aspects of how the ECHR is applied within 
UK law, hardly corresponds to the venom of Conservative criticisms of the HRA. If that is 
all that is in the legislative pipeline, some have questioned whether a British Bill of Rights 
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is necessary at all.114 Throughout David Cameron’s premiership the Conservatives 
therefore toyed with more extensive proposals, in particular sweeping away the HRA’s 
requirement that UK courts take ECtHR jurisprudence into account as a means of freeing 
them from their supposed subservience to Strasbourg.115 Of particular concern for the 
Conservatives has been the Court’s ‘living instrument’ doctrine,116 by which some ECHR 
rights have been given more extensive interpretations than were envisaged when the ECHR 
was drafted. By ‘break[ing] the formal link between the British Courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights’117 the Conservatives would prevent Strasbourg’s extensions from 
being applied directly by UK courts. Moreover, David Cameron’s team believed that once 
this step was taken the ECtHR would be obliged to grant the UK a more substantial ‘margin 
of appreciation’118 when subsequent legislation explicitly sought to restrict the operation 
of the ECHR’s qualified rights. 
The most direct way to achieve this aim would be for a British Bill of Rights to 
maintain in UK domestic law enumerated rights which are comparable to, or even mirror, 
those listed in the 1950 Convention, but to explicitly curtail the application of Strasbourg’s 
subsequent interpretations of these rights by the UK courts. Any such reform, however, 
threatens the UK’s compliance with the GFA. The GFA expressly stipulates that ‘[t]here 
will be safeguards to ensure [that] … neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe 
[the ECHR]’.119 In this context the ECHR’s provisions cannot be divorced from their 
interpretations by Strasbourg. The UK is obliged to respond to ECtHR judgments which 
apply to the UK,120 and many significant ECtHR judgments develop the interpretation of 
particular rights and therefore matter for UK law even if the UK is not a party.121 The Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
114 See EU Committee (above n.98), para.46. 
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has confirmed that it will consider whether national authorities have taken into account its 
body of jurisprudence when determining whether they have taken requisite measures in 
response to a ruling.122 
For all the packaging of this proposal as a sweeping change, when confronted with 
concerns based upon the GFA Conservative ministers solemnly intoned that ‘the protection 
of human rights is a key part of the Belfast agreement, and our Bill of Rights will continue 
to protect the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights’.123 The aim 
would seem to be to present these proposals as maintaining sufficient incorporation for 
GFA compliance. Despite such efforts to allay concerns, restrictions upon the Northern 
Ireland courts’ ability to take account of Strasbourg case law would create a three-fold 
problem for GFA compliance. First, by removing their ability to consider the jurisprudence, 
such reforms would limit the extent to which the ECHR is incorporated. Second, such a 
measure would curtail the Northern Ireland courts’ ability to assess whether actions by 
public bodies and Assembly legislation are ECHR-compliant. Third, such a restriction 
would invariably disconnect between the interpretations of ECHR rights adopted by 
Strasbourg and Northern Ireland’s courts. Such differences would likely spur an increase 
in complaints against the UK at the ECtHR. Such reforms would therefore substantially 
weaken human rights protections within the law of Northern Ireland, to the point where it 
could no longer be said to involve a meaningful incorporation of the ECHR rights.  
 
Post-Brexit: More Radical Potenetial Departures from the 1998 Settlement 
 
The proposed reforms to the UK’s domestic human rights arrangements evaluated above 
both involve enacting a British Bill of Rights which provides for a broadly equivalent 
statement of rights to those contained within the HRA. And under David Cameron’s 
leadership the Conservatives did indeed appear committed to replacing the HRA with a 
rights instrument ‘rooted in our values’124 and which placed the original ECHR’s text ‘at 
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the heart of our plan’.125 For as long as the UK remains part of the European Union (EU) 
the UK is effectively tied into the ECHR as a baseline requirement for EU membership.126 
For all that David Cameron saw electoral advantage in refusing to rule out the UK’s 
withdrawal from the Council of Europe during the 2015 UK General Election campaign,127 
after the election reverted to a position of seeking ‘to pass a British Bill of Rights, which 
we believe is compatible with our membership of the Council of Europe’.128 David 
Cameron thus seemed to tacitly accept that, for all his critique of contemporary pan-
European human rights protections, such proposals marked the limit of achievable human 
rights reforms. With Brexit, however, this major obstacle to more far-reaching reforms is 
removed. His successor, Theresa May, can therefore contemplate acting on her confirmed 
animus against an ECHR system which ‘can bind the hands of parliament, adds nothing to 
our prosperity, makes us less secure by preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign 
nationals, and does nothing to change the attitudes of governments like Russia’s when it 
comes to human rights’.129 Such action could ultimately include repeal of the HRA without 
replacement and even the UK’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe. 130  
Any attempt to return to civil liberties along pre-HRA lines, by which individuals 
were supposedly free to act in any way which does not contravene the law,131 would 
undoubtedly conflict with the GFA and would run into the same devolution challenges that 
would hamper major changes to the HRA’s core provisions. The 2014 Conservative Party 
Policy Paper on Human Rights spun a line that ‘over the centuries through our Common 
Law tradition, the UK’s protection of human rights has always been grounded in real 
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circumstance’.132 Post-Brexit, Parliamentarians concerned about the threat to human rights 
protections in Northern Ireland have been fobbed off with condescending bon mots about 
the UK’s glorious tradition of liberties stretching back to Magna Carta.133 But this tradition 
did little to curtail the litany of human-rights abuses perpetrated by the police, military and 
security agencies in the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland.134 The common law may 
well have moved on since 1998, with an increasing number of appellate judgments 
emphasising fundamental rights inherent within the common law,135 but this does not 
substitute for the ECHR’s catalogue of enumerated rights. 
The ECHR system has also moved on since 1998. Conterminous with the enactment 
of the HRA, Strasbourg’s jurisdiction to hear individual claims became compulsory.136 If 
the UK wished to remain within the ECHR without a general incorporation of the ECHR 
rights into domestic law, it could not do so on the basis of the temporary grants of 
jurisdiction to hear individual petitions it had employed into the 1990s. These temporary 
grants were often used by states to exert leverage over the Court, allowing governments to 
threaten a state’s withdrawal of individual access to the Court if its judgments became too 
uncomfortable.137 But even if individual petition, and by extension the oversight of the 
Strasbourg Court, are now fixed features of the ECHR system, this does not satisfy the 
GFA’s requirement for incorporated ECHR rights which can be employed before the 
Northern Ireland courts.  
Rather than attempting to turn back the clock to before 1998, the Conservative 
Government could contemplate withdrawing from the ECHR, an outcome supported by 
many prominent supporters of Brexit.138 In her campaign to become Conservative leader 
Theresa May recognised that she could not at present gain parliamentary support for UK 
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withdrawal from the ECHR, and made it clear that she would not pursue such a policy in 
the remainder of the current Parliament.139 Moreover, Brexit will undoubtedly place a 
considerable strain on the UK’s administrative resources, potentially marginalising other 
major reform projects. This does not, however, preclude a more a much more aggressive 
push against the UK’s membership of the Council of Europe being part of the next 
Conservative manifesto. Theresa May has already flagged up withdrawal from the ECHR 
as a priority once the legislative heavy-lifting of disentangling the UK from EU law is at 
least under way.140 Such a platform would be intuitively attractive to many Conservatives, 
even at the price of further destabilising politics in Northern Ireland. Withdrawal could not, 
however, be reconciled with the GFA. The Irish Government has insisted that ending the 
ECHR’s incorporation within Northern Ireland law would contravene the Bilateral Treaty. 
Frances Fitzgerald, the Minister for Justice and Equality, pointedly informed the UK 
Government that ‘while a domestic Bill of Rights could complement incorporation, it could 
not replace it’.141 The GFA does not directly protect the HRA, but UK cannot simply 
abandon its ECHR commitments and claim to remain GFA compliant. 
 
A Northern Ireland-Specific Solution 
 
The foregoing analysis indicates that if the UK Government is to comply with the GFA’s 
prominent ECHR-incorporation provisions its options for HRA reform are limited. But 
because the GFA’s obligations apply specifically to Northern Ireland’s law, one option 
could be for Westminster to produce a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and then proceed 
with human-rights reform without concern for the GFA’s requirements. We must therefore 
evaluate whether GFA compliance could be achieved by establishing a separate regime 
covering Northern Ireland’s ‘particular … situation’,142 and the difficulties inherent in 
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establishing such distinct arrangements. Early Conservative Party thinking on human-
rights reform proceeded on the basis that developing unique provisions for Northern 
Ireland would address the GFA’s requirements. As Dominic Grieve acknowledged in 2009, 
‘I can see no reason … why our UK Bill of Rights should not make special provision for 
Northern Ireland to reflect its need to tackle the particular circumstances there’.143 Up until 
2012 the Conservatives remained breezily confident that some Northern Ireland provisions 
could be ‘tagged on’ to UK-wide reform.144 Since then, however, increasing use of the ill-
considered “British Bill of Rights” epithet has been accompanied by equivocation over 
special arrangements for Northern Ireland.145  
In legal terms a separate regime for Northern Ireland provides the most direct means 
of tackling GFA concerns. Although Christine Bell has argued that the GFA’s reciprocity 
requirements oblige the maintenance of ECHR incorporation on a UK-wide basis, and not 
simply in Northern Ireland,146 the Bilateral Treaty explicitly compares standards of rights 
protection between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Adjustments in the standard of human 
rights protections in other parts of the UK cannot, of themselves, be taken to breach the 
requirements of reciprocity under international law.147 For its part, the Irish Government 
has been keen to kick start progress towards a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, lamenting 
the absence of a renewed commitment within the Stormont House Agreement.148 If it was 
to be GFA-compliant, however, a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights could not restrict the 
ECHR’s incorporation within Northern Ireland’s law. The sections of the GFA which 
discuss a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights maintain that no matter what ‘supplementary’ 
protections might result, the baseline of the relationship between the law of Northern 
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Ireland and the ECHR must be maintained.149 As a result, even setting aside the political 
difficulties with instituting a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, this solution would actually 
foreclose certain options for human rights reform. So as not to reduce current human rights 
protections the Northern Ireland courts would have to retain their ability to take account of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, to reinterpret provisions in a rights-compliant manner and to 
issue declarations of incompatibility with regard to UK Acts of Parliament which apply 
within Northern Ireland law. Adopting an approach which tied Northern Ireland into the 
ECHR would also stymie any effort by the UK Government to withdraw from the 
Strasbourg system.  
 
The Northern Ireland Assembly’s Consent to HRA Reform 
 
Unless the Northern Ireland Assembly consents to any of the above range of human rights 
reforms their imposition from Westminster would also undermine the institutional 
arrangements established on the basis of the GFA. Lord Sewel, a minister responsible for 
piloting the 1998 devolution legislation through the House of Lords, explained that once 
devolution was operational a constitutional convention would operate to ensure that 
‘Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland 
without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’.150 The same convention also covers Wales 
and Northern Ireland.151 If we confine “normally” in the above statement to permitting 
Westminster to legislate without consent in response to an emergency, when the UK 
Government proposes legislation which touches on devolved matters then the Sewel 
Convention requires that such a change be assented to by the Assembly by means of a 
Legislative Consent Motion.152 Under the Assembly’s standing orders Westminster 
legislation which covers a “devolution matter” includes any measure which touches upon 
an area of competence transferred to Northern Ireland’s institutions or which attempts to 
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change the Assembly’s legislative competence.153 The Assembly’s competence is bounded 
by human rights considerations, as stipulated by the GFA.154 The NIA denies the Assembly 
competence to make laws which are incompatible with incorporated ECHR rights.155 Its 
interpretation clause moreover specifies that the concept of incorporated ECHR rights ‘has 
the same meaning as in the Human Rights Act 1998’, tying together the statutes.156  
Assuming that the Assembly is functioning,157 this convention could be interpreted 
as meaning that any amendment to the HRA which would alter the competences of the 
Assembly and therefore trigger the need for a Legislative Consent Motion.158 This 
requirement would appear to pose severe difficulties for a UK Government intent on 
achieving HRA reform in a manner which respects this constitutional commitment. Even 
if the Unionist parties combined to provide a majority in the Assembly in support of a 
Legislative Consent Motion, the NIA also contains consociationalism provisions intended 
to prevent measures passed with the backing of parties representing one community from 
having a disproportionate impact upon the other community’s interests.159 The Nationalist 
parties could use these provisions to trigger a Petition of Concern,160 requiring that any 
Legislative Consent Motion authorising HRA reform receive cross-community support. By 
this route they could refuse Assembly consent for any reform which they considered a 
threat to the GFA’s human-rights obligations. The UK Government has hitherto accepted 
that unilateral action on an issue so bound up in the GFA would challenge the very nature 
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of the 1998 settlement; ‘We take our responsibilities under the Belfast agreement very 
seriously; we will not do anything to undermine it and we will work with parties to that 
end’.161 Moreover, successive Northern Ireland Secretaries have insisted that any progress 
on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights requires the Assembly’s consent: 
 
[A] legislative consent motion must be passed by the assembly in circumstances 
where the government brings forward any legislation at Westminster such as a Bill 
of Rights which will have a significant impact on devolved policy. … The British 
government is happy to move, but there is no point in moving until we have achieved 
some sort of consensus which is very much lacking at the moment.162 
 
This self-imposed commitment to consensus163 would appear to stymie the use of a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights as a way out of any impasse on HRA reform. It may well 
be that the Conservatives come to regret their studied disinterest in the NIHRC’s proposals. 
These bulwarks against imposed reform, however, appear to rest upon legislative 
consent as a constitutional convention as opposed to constitutional law.164 In the Miller 
case165 the UK Supreme Court recently ruled on the question of whether the Northern 
Ireland Assembly would, as a matter of law, have to issue a Legislative Consent Motion to 
allow the UK Parliament to legislate to begin the process of Brexit. As the Assembly’s 
legislative competence is bounded by EU law’s requirements in similar fashion to the 
provisions relating to the ECHR, the Court’s ruling is relevant to whether the HRA could 
be repealed without the Assembly’s consent.166 In Miller all eleven Supreme Court Justices 
agreed that the courts could not enforce the convention that Westminster would gain a 
Legislative Consent Motion from the devolved legislatures before legislating to authorise 
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the commencement of Brexit negotiations.167 In the words of the majority judgment, 
conventions can ‘play a fundamental role in the operation of our constitution’ but the 
policing of their scope and operation ‘does not lie within the constitutional remit of the 
judiciary’.168 Put another way, acting without Assembly consent could be unconstitutional, 
but it would not be illegal.169  
We nonetheless maintain that a direct analogy between the Assembly’s ability to 
consent to EU law and ECHR law is, in important respects, inappropriate. Miller 
emphasised that although the GFA assumed the UK’s continuing membership of the EU, 
it did not require it.170 The ECHR, however, has a much stronger basis in the GFA and 
might be said to cross the line from ‘assumed’ to ‘required’. The Supreme Court further 
asserted that the Assembly does not have a parallel legislative competence in relation to 
Brexit on the basis that ‘the EU constraints are a means by which the UK Parliament and 
government make sure that the devolved democratic institutions do not place the United 
Kingdom in breach of its EU law obligations’.171 The basis for the ECHR constraints upon 
the Assembly could not be characterised in the same way; they were imposed to reflect 
specific GFA commitments.172 If the GFA, and not parliamentary sovereignty, is accepted 
as the ‘ultimate political fact’173 underpinning Northern Ireland’s system of governance 
then even after Miller it remains arguable that as a matter of constitutional law there are 
some measures that Parliament cannot enact without the Assembly’s consent. Thus the 
Supreme Court’s judgment does not foreclose the possibility of litigation to uphold the 
need for the Assembly’s consent should Parliament attempt to redraw central features of 
the GFA settlement, such as its human rights arrangements. It does, however, suggest that 
if the UK Government is intent on forcing through human-rights reform in spite of 
constitutionally significant (but arguably purely political) requirements for Assembly 
consent, then Ireland’s ability to challenge any breach of the GFA as a breach of 
international law will take centre stage. 
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International Law’s Impact upon HRA Reform 
 
Modifying the GFA 
 
An alternate way to circumvent the GFA’s restrictions would be for the UK Government 
to seek to renegotiate of the settlement’s human rights provisions. Treaties are, of course, 
not set in stone. Successor treaties, treaty amendments, engagement of severability 
provisions and fundamental changes in circumstance all provide recognised means by 
which the binding character of some or all of a treaty like the Bilateral Treaty can be altered. 
This legal route, however, does not take account of the political context of Northern 
Ireland’s peace process. 
The first issue which arises concerns the relationship between successor and 
predecessor treaties.174 Although the Irish Government was present at the negotiation of 
the 2006 St Andrews Agreement, the ultimate Agreement was concluded between the UK 
Government and the Northern Ireland parties. The Irish Government is not a party to this 
Agreement. However, in being present, Ireland would be regarded as having acquiesced to 
the amendments made to the GFA arrangements. Annex B of the St Andrews Agreement, 
regarding human rights, specifically references the HRA, but does not mention the 
ECHR,175 exemplifying the degree to which the HRA has come in practice to underpin the 
human-rights aspects of the 1998 settlement. The language of Annex B appears to follow 
the GFA in regarding the ECHR as a human-rights baseline and that in Northern Ireland a 
form of “ECHR-plus” would be employed in the development of a Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights by the Bill of Rights Forum. The St Andrews Agreement can be understood as 
subsequent practice by the UK and Irish Governments in implementing the Bilateral 
Treaty. As such, it seems to reinforce the ECHR’s within Northern Ireland’s system of 
governance, rather than undermining it.  
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Article 59 of the VCLT allows treaties to be suspended or terminated, which as a 
matter of law remains an option available to both Governments.176 The VCLT also allows 
for successive treaties, an option which is particularly straightforward with regard to 
bilateral treaties and a route which the Irish and UK Governments have employed since the 
establishment of the Free State in 1921.177 In the circumstance of suspension or 
termination, the Bilateral Treaty including the Annex would be suspended or terminated, 
but the GFA as a political agreement within Northern Ireland would stand. Its political 
position would instead become a UK constitutional issue between the devolved 
Government and Westminster rather than a question of international law. In the 
circumstance of a successive treaty (as with the Anglo-Irish Agreement before) the 
Bilateral Treaty and Annex could be terminated between the two Governments and 
replacement terms agreed between the two parties. Nonetheless, it is extremely unlikely 
that such a change would be attempted without the consent of Northern Ireland’s political 
parties. 
The VCLT allows for the amendment of treaties. One of the issues arising from this 
option is that it is the Annex to the Treaty that requires amendment rather than the main 
part of the document. This Annex was of course subject to intense negotiation in Northern 
Ireland and thus, whilst international law would allow for its amendment, the political 
viability of such a course of action is a separate issue (in this regard, amendment would 
take place in the context of the emergent lex post bellum or lex pacificatoria).178 This pre-
supposes that the Irish Government would be open to an amendment that would change 
obligation of the ‘ECHR-plus’ protection to one of ‘ECHR-minus’. The Irish Government, 
however, regards the human rights provisions of the GFA as clear and unchanged:  
 
[A] strong human rights framework, including external supervision by the European 
Court of Human Rights, has been an essential part of the peace process and anything 
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that undermines this, or is perceived to undermine this, could have serious 
consequences for the operation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.179 
 
As a guarantor of the GFA, the Irish Government has affirmed its responsibility to 
safeguard its institutions and principles.180 In clearly voicing its intention to carry out this 
responsibility the Irish Government is positioning itself as an essential component in any 
discussion on reform or repeal of the current arrangements.  
 
Negotiating a New British-Irish Human Rights Protocol 
 
If the UK Government is not to fall foul of the obligations owed to Ireland under 
international law with regard to Northern Ireland and human rights in the course of 
substantive human-rights reform, it will have to engage in a proactive process of treaty 
renegotiation with regard to the 1998 settlement. The precedent for this process came in 
2004, when, as a result of the citizenship referendum in Ireland, changes to Ireland’s 
Constitution instituted in response to the GFA181 were in part reversed. To maintain its 
international obligations, the Irish Government first sought the UK Government’s 
agreement that ‘that this proposed change to the Constitution is not a breach of the … 
Agreement or the continuing obligation of good faith in the implementation of the said 
Agreement’.182  
Although simple in legal terms, negotiating a new British-Irish Human Rights 
Protocol would undoubtedly face serious challenges in light of the fact that the 1998 
Agreement is not a simple bi-lateral treaty. Both Governments would operate under the 
pressure of perceptions from various constituencies, notably the Northern Ireland 
parties.183 The Irish Government’s actions in renegotiations would attract pressure from 
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the public in both the Republic and Northern Ireland. A key element of the GFA settlement 
has been the inclusion of Northern Ireland’s politicians in British-Irish negotiations which 
affect the region. In 2004, however, a British-Irish Interpretive Declaration was negotiated 
in the absence of the Northern Ireland parties, and over the opposition of the SDLP and 
Sinn Féin. At the time, the SDLP’s Mark Durkan warned that ‘[t]he DUP can now cite a 
precedent which they can say shows you can unilaterally change, vary and alter the 
agreement, even going to its constitutional core’.184 To this warning can be added concerns 
over the Interpretive Declaration’s significance in international law, for it suggests that the 
Northern Ireland parties can be excluded from any subsequent renegotiation process 
between the two governments. Negotiations on a new British-Irish Human Rights Protocol, 
however, would be unlikely to follow this pattern. On an issue as central to the GFA as 
general human rights commitments, side-lining Northern Ireland’s democratically-elected 
representatives could not be countenanced by the Irish Government. This brings us back to 
the stalemate between Northern Ireland’s parties on issues of human rights, best illustrated 
by the lack of progress towards a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights in the Stormont House 
Agreement.185 There seems no obvious route towards cross-party agreement. As such, 
although renegotiating the GFA’s human-rights elements is a necessary precursor to 
altering the UK’s obligations, the place of Northern Ireland’s parties in such negotiations 
generates near insurmountable political difficulties. 
 
Challenging Unilateral Action by the UK 
 
While it is possible to pass a subsequent treaty, or to amend or sever the existing Bilateral 
Treaty’s provisions, it is not possible for the UK to do so unilaterally. Any modifications 
by the UK must be done through re-negotiation with the Irish Government and, given the 
circumstances of the GFA, in tandem with the parties in Northern Ireland. It would be near-
impossible to reopen the human rights element of the 1998 settlement in isolation from 
other aspects of the Agreement. If, in spite of these obligations the UK did proceed to act 
unilaterally, several options would become available to Ireland under international law and 
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the VLCT.186 If it considered the unilateral act to be a material breach, which is a valid 
interpretation of such action, Ireland would be entitled to terminate or suspend the whole 
or part of the treaty. Although the GFA’s Bilateral Treaty includes no dispute settlement 
clause, several options remain open to Ireland if it believes the UK to be in violation of the 
Agreement.  
One of the more obvious options, an action before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), does not appear to be a possibility. Both states, in making their declarations of 
compulsory jurisdiction (the formal recognition of the Court’s authority), have included 
qualifications that could be interpreted as excluding the other. The Irish Government has 
the most evident exclusion, which allows for all disputes to be heard at the International 
Court except those that arise between it and the UK with regard to Northern Ireland. The 
UK’s declaration is slightly more open in that it states ‘any dispute with the government of 
any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth’.187 Whether the 
UK’s exclusion would include Ireland is, however, questionable. The Commonwealth is a 
sui generis organisation and if this clause were to be extensively interpreted it would 
include a vast number of countries which were once part of the British Empire. Which 
countries are considered a part of the ‘Commonwealth’ changes depending on the 
definition one uses. One definition of the Commonwealth can be interpreted to exclude 
those countries which were not part of the organisation in 1949 when the London 
Declaration made all member states ‘free and equal’.188 Ireland had passed the Republic of 
Ireland Act 1948 which came into effect 10 days before the London Declaration, and thus 
it had left the Commonwealth before its modern incarnation. In any case, however, the 
Irish Government’s declaration does appear to exclude an ICJ case with the UK regarding 
Northern Ireland. Although the Irish Government could choose to revoke its declaration, 
the UK could argue that it relied on the Irish Government’s declaration in its dealings with 
the country including in respect of the GFA. This position is made more difficult by the 
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date of Ireland’s declaration of compulsory jurisdiction, which took place after the GFA 
negotiations. 
Beyond the ICJ, remedies for breach may be available through the law of state 
responsibility. Though the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts have not been adopted as a treaty, they 
are widely regarded as reflecting binding customary international law.189 An 
internationally wrongful act can be an act or omission which is attributable to a state and 
which constitutes a breach of its international obligation. The internal conditions or 
domestic law of a country are irrelevant to a determination of a breach.190 The Bilateral 
Treaty imposes international obligations upon the UK, and any of the options for human-
rights reform which were indicated above as breaching these GFA obligations, would 
trigger the Law of State Responsibility. Under international law, the injury to Ireland would 
include both material and moral damage, which are subject to reparations including 
restitution, compensation and or satisfaction.191 If a state refuses to acknowledge its breach 
or provide reparations the injured state can ultimately invoke proportionate 
‘countermeasures’.192 Therefore, although it is difficult to imagine such a collapse in 
relations between the UK and Ireland, if the UK did unilaterally abrogate its GFA 
commitments international law provides Ireland with options for recourse.193  
 
Conclusion 
 
Some unalloyed vision of national sovereignty underpins both Brexit and the Conservative 
Party’s aversion to the ECHR. Its proposals have given little consideration to Northern 
Ireland, seemingly proceeding on Anthony King’s ill-judged dictum that ‘[w]hat happens 
in Northern Ireland scarcely affects British constitutional development; constitutional 
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development in Britain scarcely affects what happens in Northern Ireland’.194 Our account 
has challenged the wishful thinking inherent in the notion that the arrangements covering 
Northern Ireland can be conceptually detached from the remainder of the UK constitution; 
there can be no “British” Bill of Rights without consideration of its application to Northern 
Ireland. The GFA, moreover, was not a simple Bilateral Treaty between the UK and 
Ireland. As the primary instrument enabling Northern Ireland’s peace settlement it became 
part of the ‘metaconstitutional discourse’ between the two countries.195 As such, the GFA 
was rooted in the ECHR and EU as legal orders which bind both the UK and Ireland.196 Of 
the two, however, the ECHR’s roots are by far the deeper, and are all but impossible to 
unearth if the UK Government remains ‘committed to honouring the Belfast Agreement’ 
and to ensuring that ‘our proposals for a Bill of Rights are compatible with it.’197 Any 
meaningful attempt at UK-wide human-rights reform will undoubtedly collide with the 
UK’s obligations under the GFA. As a consequence, the Conservative Government will 
have to compromise the vision of a British Bill of Rights which it has sold to its supporters, 
or be prepared to flout the Agreement’s terms. 
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